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ABSTRACT 
The paper presents application of data mining techniques to fraud analysis. We 
present some classification and prediction data mining techniques which we 
consider important to handle fraud detection. There exist a number of data 
mining algorithms and we present statistics-based algorithm,   decision tree-
based algorithm and rule-based algorithm. We present Bayesian classification 
model to detect fraud in automobile insurance.  Naïve Bayesian visualization is 
selected to analyze and interpret the classifier predictions. We illustrate how 
ROC curves can be deployed for model assessment in order to provide a more 
intuitive analysis of the models.  
Keywords: Data Mining, Decision Tree, Bayesian Network, ROC Curve, 
Confusion Matrix 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Data mining refers to extracting or “mining” knowledge from large amount of 
data. There are a number of data mining techniques like clustering, neural 
networks, regression, multiple predictive models. Here, we discuss only few 
techniques of data mining which would be considered important to handle fraud 
detection. They are i) Bayesian network, for classifying risk group, and ii) 
Decision tree, for creating descriptive model of each risk group.  
Data Mining is associated with (a) supervised learning based on training data of 
known fraud and legitimate cases and (b) unsupervised learning with data that 
are not labeled to be fraud or legitimate. Bedford’s law can be interpreted as an 
example of unsupervised learning (Bolton et al. 2002). The direct application of 
these methods to forensic accounting is limited due to almost complete 
nonexistence of large sets of fraud training data (Bolton et al. 2002; Jensen, 
1997). 
Insurance fraud, credit card fraud, telecommunications fraud, and check forgery 
are some of the main types of fraud. Insurance fraud is common in automobile, 
travel. The Uniform Suspected Insurance Fraud Reporting Form, adopted by the 
NAIC Antifraud Task Force 2003, replaced the prior Task Force form. This form 
standardizes insurance fraud data for the insurance industry and makes it easier 
to report and track. Fraud detection involves three types of offenders (Baldock, 
1997): i) Criminal offenders, ii) organized criminal offenders who are 
responsible for major fraud, and iii) offenders who commit fraud (called soft 
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fraud) when suffering from financial hardship. Soft fraud is the hardest to lessen 
because the   cost for each suspected incident is usually higher than the cost of 
the fraud (National White Collar Crime Center, 2003). Types i) and ii) offenders, 
called hard fraud, avoid anti-fraud measures (Sparrow, 2002). 
We present data mining techniques which are most appropriate for fraud 
analysis. We present automobile insurance example. Three data mining 
techniques used for fraud analysis are: i) Bayesian network, ii) Decision tree, and 
iii) backpropagation. Bayesian network is the technique used for classification 
task. Classification, given a set of predefined categorical classes, determines 
which of these classes a specific data belongs to. Decision trees are used to create 
descriptive models. Descriptive models are created to describe the characteristics 
of fault.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the 
existing fraud detection systems and techniques. Section 3 the three classification 
algorithms and application. Section 4 presents the data. Finally, in section 5, we 
discuss the important features of our work and further work. 
2. EXISTING FRAUD DETECTION SYSTEMS 
A fuzzy logic system (Altrock et al. 1995) incorporated the actual fraud evaluation 
policy using optimum threshold values. The result showed the chances of fraud and 
the reasons why an insurance claim is fraudulent. This system predicted slightly 
better results than the auditors. Another   logic system (Cox et al. 1995) used two 
approaches to imitate the reasoning of fraud experts, i) the discovery model,  uses an 
unsupervised neural network to find the relationships in data and to find clusters, 
then patterns within the clusters are identified, and ii) the fuzzy anomaly detection  
model, which used Wang-Mendel algorithm to find how health care providers 
committed fraud against insurance companies. The EFD system (Major et al. 1995) 
integrated the expert knowledge with statistical information to identify providers 
whose behavior did not fit the rule.  
The hot spots methodology (Williams et al. 1997) performed a three step process: i) 
k-means clustering algorithm for cluster detection is used because the other 
clustering algorithms tend to be computationally expensive where the datasets are 
very large, ii) C4.5 algorithm,   the resulting decision tree can be converted to a rule 
set and pruned, and iii) visualization tools for rule evaluation, building statistical 
summaries of the entities associated with each rule. (Williams, 1999) extended the 
hot spots methodology to use genetic algorithms to generate and explore the rules.  
The credit fraud model (Groth et al. 1998) suggested a classification technique with 
fraud/legal attribute, and a clustering followed by a classification technique with no 
fraud/legal attribute. Kohonen's Self-Organizing Feature Map (Brockett et al. 1998) 
was used to categorize automobile injury claims depending on the size of fraud 
suspicion. The validity of the Feature Map was then evaluated using a back 
propagation algorithm and feed forward neural networks. Result showed that the 
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method was more reliable and consistent compared to the fraud assessment.  
Classification techniques have proved to be very effective in fraud detection (He et 
al. 1998; Chen et al. 1999) and therefore, can be applied to categorize crime data. 
The distributed data mining model (Chen et al. 1999) uses a realistic cost model to 
evaluate C4.5, CART, and naïve Bayesian classification models. The method was 
applied to credit card transactions. The neural data mining approach (Brause et al. 
1999) uses rule-based association rules to mine symbolic data and Radial Basis 
Function neural network to mine analog data. The approach discusses the importance 
of use of non-numeric data in fraud detection. It was found that the results of 
association rules increased the predictive accuracy. 
SAS Enterprise Miner Software (SAS e-intelligence, 2000) depends on association 
rules, cluster detection and classification techniques to detect fraudulent claims. The 
Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) and Artificial Neural Network (ANN)  study used 
the STAGE algorithm for BBN in fraud detection and backpropagation for ANN 
(Maes et al. 2002). STAGE repeatedly alternates between two stages of search: 
running the original search method on objective function, and running hill-climbing 
to optimize the value function. The result shows that BBNs were much faster to 
train, but were slower when applied to new instances.  FraudFocus Software 
(Magnify, 2002) automatically scores all claims. The scores are sorted in descending 
order of fraud potential and generate descriptive rules for fraudulent claims. 
FairIsaac(Weatherford et al. 2002) recommended backpropagation neural networks 
for fraudulent credit card use. The ASPECT group (Weatherford et al. 2002) focused 
on neural networks to train current user profiles and user profiles histories. A caller’s 
current profile and the profile history are compared to find probable fraud. (Cahill et 
al. 2002) build on the adaptive fraud detection framework (Fawcett et al. 1997) by 
applying an event-driven approach of assigning fraud scores to detect fraud. The 
(Cahill et al. 2002) framework can also detect types of fraud using rules. This 
framework has been used in both wireless and wired fraud detection systems.  
(Ormerod el al.  2003)  used dynamic BBNs called Mass Detection tool to detect 
fraudulent claims, which then used a rule generator called Suspicion Building Tool.  
The different types of fraud detection are: internal, insurance, credit card, and 
telecommunications fraud detection. Internal fraud detection consists in determining 
fraudulent financial reporting by management (Lin et al. 2003; Bell et al. 2000), and 
abnormal retail transactions by employees (Kim et al. 2003). There are four types  of 
insurance fraud detection: home insurance (Bentley, 2000; Von Altrock, 1997), crop 
insurance (Little et al. 2002), automobile insurance fraud detection(Phua et al. 2004; 
Viaene et al. 2004; Brockett et al. 2002; Stefano et al. 2001; Belhadji et al. 2000), 
and health  insurance (Yamanishi et al. 2004; Riedinger et al. 2002). A single meta-
classifier(Phua et al. 2004)  is used  to select  the best base classifiers, and then 
combined  with these base classifiers’ predictions to improve cost savings (stacking-
bagging). Automobile insurance fraud detection data set was used to demonstrate the 
stacking-bagging problem.  Credit card fraud detection refers to screening credit 
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applications (Wheeler et al. 2000), and/or logged credit card transactions (Foster et 
al. 2004; Fan, 2004; Chen et al. 2004; Chiu et al. 2004; Kim et al. 2002; Maes et al. 
2002; Syeda et al. 2002). Telecommunications subscription data (Cortes et al. 2003; 
Cahill et al. 2002; Rosset et al. 1999; Moreau et al. 1997), and/or wired and wireless 
phone calls (Kim et al. 2003; Burge et al. 2001) are monitored. Credit transactional 
fraud detection has been presented by (Foster et al. 2004) and bad debts prediction 
(Ezawa et al. 1996). Employee/retail (Kim et al. 2003), national crop insurance 
(Little et al. 2002), and credit application (Wheeler et al. 2000). Literature focus on 
video-on-demand websites (Barse et al. 2003) and IP-based telecommunication 
services (McGibney et al. 2003). Online sellers (Bhargava et al. 2003) and online 
buyers (Sherman, 2002) can be monitored by automated systems. Fraud detection in 
government organisations such as tax (Bonchi et al. 1999) and customs (Shao et al. 
2002) has also been reported.  
We discuss below supervised data mining technique to detect crime using Bayesian 
Belief Networks, Decision trees, and Artificial Neural Networks. 
2.1 Bayesian Belief Networks 
Bayesian Belief Networks provide a graphic model of causal relationships on 
which class membership probabilities(Han et al. 2000) are predicted, so that a 
given instance is legal or fraud (Prodromidis, 1999). Naïve Bayesian 
classification assumes that the attributes of an instance are independent, given 
the target attribute (Feelders et al. 2003). The aim is to assign a new instance to 
the class that has the highest posterior probability. The algorithm is very 
effective and can give better predictive accuracy when compared to C4.5 
decision trees and backpropagation (Domingos et al. 1996; Elkan et al. 2001). 
However, when the attributes are redundant, the predictive accuracy is reduced 
(Witten et al. 1999). 
2.2 Decision Trees 
Decision trees are machine learning techniques that express independent attributes 
and a dependent attribute in a tree-shaped structure that represents a set of decisions 
(Witten et al. 1999). Classification rules, extracted from decision trees, are IF-THEN 
expressions in which the preconditions are logically ANDed and all the tests have to 
succeed if each rule is to be generated. The related applications include the analysis 
of instances from drug smuggling, governmental financial transactions (Mena et al. 
2003), and customs declaration fraud (Shao et al. 2002) to more serious crimes such 
as drug related homicides, serial sex crimes (SPSS, 2003), and homeland 
security(James et al. 2002; Mena et al. 2003). Data mining methods have solved 
security and criminal detection problems. [Mena, 2003] reviewed the subject 
(intelligent agents, link analysis, text mining, decision trees, self-organizing maps, 
machine learning, and neural networks) for security managers, law enforcement 
investigators, counter-intelligence agents, fraud specialists, and information security 
analysts. C4.5 (Quinlan et al. 1993) is used to divide data into segments based and to 
generate descriptive classification rules that can be used to classify a new instance. 
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C4.5 can help to make predictions and to extract crime patterns. It generates rules 
from trees (Witten et al.., 1999) and handles numeric attributes, missing values, 
pruning, and estimating error rates. C4.5 performs slightly better than CART and 
ID3 (Prodromidis, 1999) in terms of predictive accuracy. The learning and 
classification steps are generally fast(Han et al. 2000). However, performance 
decrease can occur when C4.5 is applied to large datasets. C5.0 shows marginal 
improvements to decision tree induction.  
2.3 Artificial Neural Networks 
Artificial Neural Networks represent complex mathematical equations with 
summations, exponentials, and parameters to copy neurons (Berry et al. 2000). 
They have been applied to classify crime instances such as burglary, sexual 
offences, and known criminals’ facial characteristics (Mena et al. 2003b). 
Backpropagation neural networks can process a large number of instances with 
tolerance to noisy data and has the ability to classify patterns on which they 
have not been trained (Han et al. 2000). They are appropriate where the results 
of the model are more important (Berry et al. 2000). However, 
backpropagation require long training hours, extensive testing, retaining 
parameters like the number of hidden neurons, learning rate (Bigus, 1996). 
3. APPLICATION 
The steps in crime detection are: i) classifiers, ii) integrate multiple classifiers, 
iii) ANN approach to clustering, and iv) visualization techniques to describe 
the patterns. 
3.1 Bayesian Network 
Bayesian Network is a Directed Acyclic Graph, where each node represents a 
random variable and is associated with the conditional probability of the node given 
its parents. This model shows each variable in a given domain as a node in the graph 
and dependencies between these variables as arcs connecting the respective nodes. 
That is, all the edges in the graphical model are directed and there are no cycles. 
For the purpose of fraud detection, we construct two Bayesian networks to describe 
the behavior of auto insurance. First, a Bayesian network is constructed to model 
behavior under the assumption that the driver is fraudulent (F) and another model 
under the assumption the driver is a legitimate user (NF), see Figure 3. The ‘fraud 
net’ is set up by using expert knowledge. The ‘user net’ is set up by using data from 
non fraudulent drivers. During operation user net is adapted to a specific user based 
on emerging data. By inserting evidence in these networks (the observed user 
behavior x derived from his toll tickets) and propagating it through the network, we 
can get the probability of the measurement x under two above mentioned 
hypotheses. This means, we obtain judgments to what degree an observed user 
behavior meets typical fraudulent or non-fraudulent behavior. These quantities we 
call p(x|NF) and p(x|F). By postulating the probability of fraud P(F) and P(NF) = 1-
P(F) in general and by applying Bayes’ rule, we get the probability of fraud, given 
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the measurement x, 
P(F|x) = P(F)p(x|F)/  p(x) 
where,  the denominator p(x) can be calculated as 
P(x) = P(F)p(x|F) + P(NF)p(x|NF)  
The chain rule of probabilities is: 
Suppose there are two classes C1, C2 for fraud and legal respectively. Given an 
instance  
X = (X1, X2, …, Xn) and each row is represented by an attribute vector A = (A1, 
A2, …, An) 
The classification is to derive the maximum P(Ci|X) which can be derived from 
Bayes’ theorem as given in the following steps: 
i) P(fraud|X) = [P(fraud | X) P(fraud)] / P(X) 
 
P(legal|X) = [P(legal | X) P(legal)] / P(X) 
 
As  P(X) is constant for all classes, only  [P(fraud | X) P(fraud)] and [P(legal | 
X) P(legal)] need to be maximized.  
ii) The class prior probabilities may be estimated by: 
P(fraud) = si  / s 
 
Here, s is the total number of training examples and si   is the number of 
training examples of class fraud. 
iii) A simplified assumption of no dependence relation between 
attributes is made.  
Thus, 
 P(X|fraud)  = ∏
=
n
k 1
 P(xk |fraud)    
and P(X|legal)  = ∏
=
n
k 1
 P(xk |legal)    
The probabilities P(x1 |fraud),   P(x2 |fraud) can be estimated from the training 
samples: 
P(xk |fraud) = sik / si 
Here, si  is the number of training examples for class fraud and  si k  is the 
number of training examples of class with value xk for Ak 
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3.1.1 Application 
We present Bayesian learning algorithm to predict occurrence of fraud. 
Using the “Output” classification results for Table 1, there are 17 tuples 
classified as legal, and 3 as fraud. To facilitate classification, we divide 
the age of driver attribute into ranges: 
 
Table 1: Training set 
Instance  Name Gender Age_ 
driver 
fault Driver_ 
rating 
Vehicle_ 
age 
Output  
1 David Okere M 25 1 0 2 legal 
2 Beau Jackson M 32 1 1 5 fraud 
3 Jeremy Dejean M 40 0 0 7 legal 
4 Robert Howard M 35 1 0.33 1 legal 
5 Crystal Smith F 22 1 0.66 8 legal 
6 Chibuike Penson M 36 0 0.66 6 legal 
7 Collin Pyle M 42 1 0.33 3 legal 
8 Eric Penson M 39 1 1 2 fraud 
9 Kristina Green F 29 1 0 4 legal 
10 Jerry Smith M 33 1 1 5 legal 
11 Maggie Frazier F 42 1 0.66 3 legal 
12 Justin Howard M 21 1 0 2 fraud 
13 Michael Vasconi M 37 0 0.33 4 legal 
14 Bryan Thompson M 32 1 0.33 4 legal 
15 Chris Wilson M 28 1 1 6 legal 
16 Michael Pullen M 42 1 0 5 legal 
17 Aaron Dusek M 48 1 0.33 8 legal 
18 Bryan Sanders M 49 1 0 3 legal 
19 Derek Garrett M 32 0 0 3 legal 
20 Jasmine Jackson F 27 0 1 2 legal 
X Crystal Smith F 31 1 0 2 ? 
 
Table 2 shows the counts and subsequent probabilities associated with the 
attributes. With these simulated training data, we estimate the prior 
probabilities: 
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The classifier has to predict the class of instance to be fraud or legal. 
P(fraud) = si / s =  3/20  = 0.15 
P(legal)  = si / s =17/20  = 0.85 
 
Table 2: Probabilities associated with attributes 
Attribute Value Count Probabilities 
  legal fraud legal Fraud 
Gender 
M 13  3 13/17 3/3 
F 4 0 4/17 0/3 
age_driver (20, 25) 3 0 3/18 0 
 (25, 30) 4 0 4/18 0 
 (30, 35) 3 1 3/18 1/2 
 (35, 40) 3 1 3/18 1/2 
 (40, 45) 3 0 3/18 0 
 (45, 50) 2 0 2/18 0 
fault 0 5 0 5/17 0 
 1 12 3 12/17 3/17 
driver_rating 0  6 1 6/17 1/3 
 0.33  5 0 5/17 0 
 0.66 3 0 3/17 0 
 1 3 2 3/17 2/3 
 
We use these values to classify a new tuple. Suppose, we wish to classify X = 
(Crystal Smith, F, 31). By using these values and the associated probabilities of 
gender and driver age, we obtain the following estimates: 
P(X |legal) = 4/17 * 3/18 = 0.039 
P(X |fraud) = 3/3 * 1/2    = 0.500 
 
Thus, likelihood of being legal = 0.039 *0.9=0.0351 
Likelihood of being fraud = 0.500 *0.1= 0.050 
We estimate P(X) by summing up these individuals likelihood values since X 
will be either legal of fraud: 
P(X) = 0.0351 + 0.050 = 0.0851 
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Finally, we obtain the actual probabilities of each event: 
P(legal | X) = (0.039 *0.9)/0.0851= 0.412 
P(fraud |X) = (0.500 *0.1) / 0.0851= 0.588 
 
Therefore, based on these probabilities, we classify the new tuple as fraud 
because it has the highest probability.  
Since attributes are treated as independent, the addition of redundant ones 
reduces its predictive power. To relax this conditional independence is to add 
derived attributes which are created from combinations of existing attributes. 
Missing data cause problems during classification process. Naïve Bayesian 
classifier can handle missing values in training datasets. To demonstrate this, 
seven missing values appear in dataset.  
The naïve Bayes approach is easy to use and only one scan of the training data 
is required. The approach can handle missing values by simply omitting that 
probability when calculating the likelihoods of membership in each class. 
Although the approach is straightforward, it does not always yield satisfactory 
results. The attributes usually are not independent. We could use subset of the 
attributes by ignoring any that are dependent on others. The technique does not 
handle continuous data. Dividing the continuous values into ranges could be 
used to solve this problem, but the division of the continuous values is a 
tedious task, and how this is done can impact the results. 
3.2 DECISION TREE-BASED ALGORITHM 
A decision tree (DT) is a tree associated with a database that has each internal 
node labeled with an attribute, each arc labeled with a predicate that can be 
applied to the attribute, and each leaf node labeled with a class. Solving the 
classification problem is a two-step process: i) decision tree induction- 
construct a DT, and ii) apply the DT to determine its class. Rules can be 
generated that are easy to interpret. They scale well for large databases because 
the tree size is independent of the database size.  
DT algorithms do not easily handle continuous data. The attribute domains 
must be divided into categories. Handling missing is difficult. Since the DT is 
constructed from the training data, overfitting may occur. This can be 
overcome via tree pruning. 
3.2.1 C4.5 Algorithm 
The basic algorithm for decision tree is s follows: 
i) Suppose there are two classes for fraud and legal. The tree starts as   a 
single node N representing the training samples.  
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ii) If the samples are of the same class fraud, then the node becomes a 
leaf and is labeled as fraud. 
iii) Otherwise, the algorithm uses an entropy-based measure as a heuristic 
for selecting the attribute that will best separate the samples into 
individual classes.  
 
The entropy, or expected information  needed to classify a given 
sample  is: 
I(fraud, legal)=  -  (NumberFraudSamples /  NumberSamples)   
log2 (NumberFraudSamples / NumberSamples) – 
(NumberLegalSamples / NumberSamples)   
log2 (NumberLegalSamples / NumberOfSamples) 
 
iv)  Expected information or entropy required to classify into subsets by 
test attribute E is: 
E(A) = ∑ [(NumberTestAttributeFraudValues/ NumberSamples) + 
(NumberTestAttributeLegalValues/ NumberSamples)]* 
[I(TestAttributeFraudValues, TestAttributeLegalValues)] 
v)  Expected reduction in entropy is: 
Gain(A)= I – E(A) 
The algorithm computes the information gain of each attribute. The 
attribute with highest information gain is the one selected for test 
attribute. 
vi) A branch is created for each known value of the test attribute. The 
algorithm uses the same process iteratively to form a decision tree at 
each partition. Once an attribute has occurred at a node, it need not be 
considered in any of the node’s descendents. 
The iterative partitioning stops only when one of the conditions is true: a) all 
examples for a given node belong to the same class, or b) there are no 
remaining attributes on which samples may be further partitioned. If this is the 
case, a leaf is created with the   class in majority among samples, c) there are 
no samples for the branch test-attribute. In this case, a leaf is created with the 
majority class in samples 
3.3 Rule Based Algorithm 
One way to perform classification is to generate if-then rules.  There are 
algorithms that generate rules from trees as well as algorithms that generate 
rules without first creating DTs. 
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3.3.1 Generating Rules from a Decision Tree 
The following rules are generated for the Decision Tree (DT). 
 
If driver age =25, then class = legal 
If (driver_age =40)  ∧  (vehicle_age =7), then class = legal 
If (driver_age =32) )  ∧  (driver_rating =1), then class = fraud 
If (driver_age ≤  40) )  ∧  (driver_rating =1) )  ∧  (vehicle_age =2), then class 
= fraud 
If (driver_age > 40) )  ∧  (driver_age  ≤  50) )  ∧  (driver_rating = 0.33), then 
class = legal 
 
4. MODEL PERFORMANCE 
4.1 Confusion Matrix 
There are two ways to examine the performance of classifiers: i) confusion 
matrix, and ii) to use a ROC graph. Given a class, Cj, and a tuple, ti, that tuple 
may or may not be assigned to that class while its actual membership may or 
may not be in that class. With two classes, there are four possible outcomes 
with the classification as: i) true positives (hits), ii) false positives (false 
alarms), iii) true negatives (correct rejections), and iv) false negatives.  False 
positive occurs if the actual outcome is legal but incorrectly predicted as fraud. 
False negative occurs when the actual outcome is fraud but incorrectly 
predicted as legal. A confusion matrix (Kohavi and Provost, 1998), Table 3a, 
contains information about actual and predicted classifications. Performance is 
evaluated using the data in the matrix. Table 3b shows confusion matrix built 
on simulated data. It shows the classification model being applied to the test 
data that consists of 7000 instances roughly split evenly between two classes. 
The model commits some errors and has an accuracy of 78%.  We also applied 
the model to the same data, but to the negative class with respect to class skew 
in the data. The quality of a model highly depends on the choice of the test 
data. We also that that ROC curves are not so dependent on the choice of test 
data, at least with class skew. 
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Table 3a:  Confusion Matrix 
 
Observed  
legal fraud  
predicted legal TP FP 
 fraud FN TN 
 
Table 3b: Confusion matrix of a model applied to test dataset 
 
              Observed  
legal fraud 
accuracy: 
0.78 
predicted legal 3100 1125 
recall:      
0.86 
 fraud 395 2380 
precision: 
0.70 
   
A number of model performance metrics (Table 3c) can be derived from the 
confusion matrix.    
 
Table 3c: Performance metrics 
model performance metrics  
Accuracy(AC) 
 
Recall or true positive rate(TP) 
 
False positive rate(FP) 
 
True negative rate(TN) 
 
False negative rate(FN) 
 
Precision(P) 
 
geometric mean(g-mean) 
 
F-measure 
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The accuracy determined in (Table 3b)  may not be an adequate performance 
measure when the number of negative cases is much greater than the number of 
positive cases (Kubat et al.., 1998). Suppose there are 1500 cases, 1460 of 
which are negative cases and 40 of which are positive cases. If the system 
classifies them all as negative, the accuracy would be 97.3%, even though the 
classifier missed all positive cases. Other performance measures are geometric 
mean (g-mean) (Kubat et al.., 1998), and F-Measure (Lewis and Gale, 1994). 
For calculating F-measure, β has a value from 0 to ∞ and is used to control the 
weight assigned to TP and P. Any classifier evaluated using g-mean or F-
measure will have a value of 0, if all positive cases are classified incorrectly.  
To easily view and understand the output, visualization of the results is helpful.  
Naïve Bayesian visualization provides an interactive view of the prediction 
results. The attributes can be sorted by the predictor and evidence items can be 
sorted by the number of items in its storage bin. Attribute column graphs help 
to find the significant attributes in neural networks. Decision tree visualization 
builds trees by splitting attributes from C4.5 classifiers. 
Cumulative gains and lift charts are visual aids for measuring model 
performance. Lift is a measure of a predictive model calculated as the ratio 
between the results obtained with or without the predictive model. For 
instance, if 105 of all samples are actually fraud and a naïve Bayesian classifier 
could correctly predict 20 fraud samples per 100 samples, then that 
corresponds to a lift of 4.  
Table 4: Costs of Predictions 
fraud legal 
True Positive(Hit) cost= number of 
hits* average cost per investigation 
False Positive(False alarm) 
cost=number of false alarms 
* (Average cost per 
investigation + average cost 
per claim)  
False Negative(miss) cost= number of 
misses* average cost per claim 
True Negative(correct 
rejection) cost = number of 
correct rejection claims * 
average cost per claim 
 
Table 4 shows that True Positives (hits) and False Positives (false alarms) 
require cost per investigation. False alarms cost are the most expensive because 
both investigation and claim costs are required. False Negatives (misses) and 
True Negatives(correct rejection) are the cost of claim.  
4.2 Relative Operating Characteristic Curve 
Another way to examine the performance of classifiers is to use a Relative 
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Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve, (Swets, 1988). A ROC graph is a curve 
that depicts the performance and performance tradeoff of a classification model 
(Fawcett, 2004, Flach, 2004) with the False Positives along X -axis and the 
True Positives along the Y axis. The point (0, 1) is the perfect classifier: it 
classifies all positive cases and negative cases correctly. It is (0, 1) because the 
false positive FP is 0, and the TP rate is 1. The point (0, 0) represents a 
classifier that predicts all cases to be negative, while the point (1, 1) 
corresponds to a classifier that predicts every case to be positive. Point (1, 0) is 
the classifier that is incorrect for all classifications. An ROC curve or point is 
independent of class distribution or error costs (Provost et al.., 1998). It sums 
all information contained in the confusion matrix, since FN is the complement 
of TP and TN is the complement of FP (Swets, 1988). It provides a visual tool 
for examining the exchange between a classifier to correctly identify positive 
cases and the number of negative cases incorrectly classified. 
We introduce to new performance metrics to construct ROC curves (in 
confusion matrix terms), the TP Rate (TPR) and the FP Rate (FPR): 
 
TPR(recall) = TP / (TP+FN) 
 
FPR = FP / (TN +FP) 
 
The classifier is mapped to the same point in the ROC graph regardless of 
whether the original test set with sampled down negative class is used 
illustrating that ROC graphs are not sensitive to class skew. 
One way of comparing ROC points is by using an equation that equates 
accuracy with the Euclidian distance from the perfect classifier, the point (0, 
1). We include a weight factor that allows defining relative misclassification 
costs.  We define ACd as a distance based performance measure:  
, where W ranges from 0 to 1, that 
is used to assign relative importance to false positives and false negatives. ACd 
ranges from 0 for the perfect classifier to sqrt(2) for a classifier that classifies 
all cases incorrectly. ACd differs from g-mean1, g-mean2 and F-measure in that 
it is equal to 0 only if all cases are classified correctly. In other words, a 
classifier evaluated using ACd gets some credit for correct classification of 
negative cases, regardless of its accuracy in correctly identifying positive cases.  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
We studied the existing fraud detection systems. To predict and present fraud 
we used Naïve Bayesian classifier. We looked at model performance metrics 
derived from the confusion matrix. We illustrated how ROC curves can be 
deployed for model assessment. Performance metrics such as accuracy, recall, 
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and precision are derived from the confusion matrix. ROC analysis provides a 
highly visual account of a model’s performance. It is strong with respect to 
class skew, making it a reliable performance metric in many important fraud 
detection application areas.  
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